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For every bookmaker has a rule for what happens to a wager if it is placed on an event that ends up being abandoned for some reason. As with pretty much anything in countries like the UK, weather can have a massive impact on whether an event is likely to finish. Obvious examples include such things as lightning storms or flash floods, but snow flurries that make it impossible to see the markings on the pitch or the ball can also give the match officials pause for thought. Crowd safety will always be one of the first things that is taken into consideration by those who decide whether or not a match will be allowed to carry on.

Betting pontianak timur the lame tsonga vs nishikori betting expert football

Betting pontianak timur the lame

K9lang, the whole of Klang-i. Arab, Ar. Arabian, Arabic; negr'i A. Arjuna, Skr. Asrafil, Ar. Aur, a generic name given to many large bamboos. Awang, I. B ]ba, the name of the second letter of baba, a Straits-born Chinese; a the alphabet.

Mglay'i, the M alay language; tiada tahu b. Dutch a measure of superficies a bouw. Jblang, I. II, a missile; to hurl a missile, III. Balchi, Baluchi, negiri B. Balinese; Pulau B. China, the Chinese; birbangsa, of birth; nobly born. Bari, I. God the Creator. Batak, an aboriginal tribesman; a Battak; mrmbatak, to lead a nomadic life. Bgnggala or b.

Bombai, imported onions; b. China, garlic; b. China, the jujube; buah b. Blanda, Dutch; orang b. Wtlas, eleven; dua b. European of goods ; imported from afar; tali b. Dutch blue. Penang to plant padi. B3nggali, a native of the presidency of Calcutta. China, China; orang b. Burma; orang B. Pali a mendicant Buddhist priest. Bisnu, Skr. BOROS 'kap, going back on one's word, pre, varication.

Zombai, Bombay; mdmbuang kan: ggri B. II1 the throat-halliards in rigging t. Dutch a metal pail. China b. II, affectation; airs. Chanchang, sticking up, rising to a point as certain forms of native head-dress. Kedah panniers for an elephant. China, in the Chinese language or in the Chinese way. Kedah to quarrel. China, Chinese; orang Ch. Perak a tapir. Straits a barber; rncnchukur, to shave; pisau pEnchukur or pisatU plnyukur, a razor.

D daba, hawa-daba, odour, smell; suspicion. Kedah crooning a child. Riau Johor exposing for fermentation. DALAM daham, onom. Dajal, Ar. Antichrist; the false Messiah. Dutch main dam, draughts. Naning your servant; I. DAYA:data ng, coming; approach; daripada Allah datang-nya, it comes to us from God; datangkan or menda. Dayalk, Dyak. Allah, by God. Spanish fly. Durga, Skr.

E ebean, flinging out of the way. Penang gutta; bUrekur-e. Olong, see long. Smbachaang, the horse-mango mangifera foetida , also machang and bachang. Imban, an arrangement of ropes enabling a porter to secure a burden borne on the back.

Imbun, dew; e. Impap, onom. Impat, four; 6. Gmping, rice plucked, crushed and cooked before it has attained matu.. Smpok, a soft spot in fruit. Bnggal, gnggok Bnggil, e. Bnjut, mznggnjut, to tug as a fish tugs at a line. Bropah, Europe. F faedah, Ar. Farsi, Ar.

Persian; bahasa F. G gabas, coarse; roughly done of work. Oangga, Skr. Cgaung, sound dulled or confused by echo; reverberation. Cmbong, a bubble; anything blown out with wind; gilllinbongan, a blown-out bladder made of a chicken's crop;? O-tar, gtgmntar, etc. Sb1etek, in.

Y gi1i, ticklishness; the desire to laugh; g. Wnngggloder, to straggle for freedom; to try to get loose. Itrying to get information by " bluff. Dutch the framework of a house. I, me. H habat, way, manner. Habshi, Ar. Abyssinian, Ethiopian, Negro; orang H. Allah, God's poor; h. Komnpgni, Indian convicts, h. Xaxomaxa, Skr. Siti Hawa, Eve. Hindi, Indian. Hindu, Hindoo, Hindustan, India. Kokian, Ch. Holanda, Dutch; also BWlanda.

Hongkoug, Hongkong; kereta h. Hua, Ar. Hudai, orang H. I ia, he, she, it; ia-itu, that is to say; namely. Iblis, Ar. Igama, Skr. Islam, Muhammadanism; also agama and. Ilaha, Ar. God; la Ilaha ila'llah, there is no God but Allah.

Ilahat, Ar. Indira, Skr. Inggbris, English. Lukas, the gospel according to St. Isa, Ar. Nabi Isa, Jesus Christ in Muhammadan tradition. Iskandar, Ar. Alexander; I. Islam, Ar. Istambul, Constantinople. J jabal, Ar. Izrael, Ar. Jajat, to mimic; taking off; ridiculing by mimicry. Janjam, water very poetically ex. Janggi, I. Zanzibari; African; Tauh j,, a tree supposed to grow in the centre of the great ocean; buah pauh j. II, P-lrs.

II spreading above ground of the roots of a tree such as the mangrove. Jarah, I. II Ar, a mite; an. Jaral, I. Jarum, a needle; j. JTaudi, Ar. Jawa, Javanese; tanah J. Jawi, I. Malayan; Sumatran and Javan; hurtufJ. Sjeeh, slightly leaking or spilling.

J61lpok, onom. Jbpun, Japan. Elmo's light; an ignis fatuius taken by sea-faring Malays to be an evil spirit. Jbrupeh, mgnj9rupeh, to add a band or layer to the top of anything so as to increase its height. Jibrael, Ar. Jima', Ar. Jumaat, Ar. K ka, I. Ikabut, cloudy, misty, indistinct; mist; hilang k. Ikacha, glass the material ; roda 7c. China, the pea-nut arachis hypogcea ; also k. Jgpun, the soy bean soya hispida ; k. Muhammadan; also kapir.

Batek, Javanese painted sarongs; k. Jalor a bamboo gong. I:kalam, I. Kedah kalang ayam, a hen-roost. Ikalas, I. Dutch room; a cabin in a ship. BWlanda, a sheep; k. Bgnggala, a large imported goat; k. Kantong, Ch. Kapri, Caffre, African, Negro. Balanda, chalk; k. Karun, Ar. Koral the enemy of Moses , believed by Malays to have been a man of enormous wealth whose treasure is new buried in the earth for wizard to find.

Dyak head hunting. Ik]dilai, kachang kedelai, a plant phaseolus mungo. Uclana, I. Ikblara, ikan lkilara, a fish unidentifled. Lklasi, I. Z ates leuciscus. Mblindan, strong sewing thread. X6ling, "Kling," a name applied to all immigrants from the Coromandel coast but sometimes limited to Muhammadan immigrants from that coast the others being called Orang Hindu ; orang K.

U3liru, confusion of thought; muddle-headedness; pikir k. Tklodak, thunder-cf. Jk1lok, a curve; an arc; a semicircle; birkalok-kBlok, cut in semi-circles of a border -cf. Jc6manig, an evil spirit affecting newborn children. Ukmpang, a sort of dug-out used on rivers.

Jkmpong, shrunken about the cheeks as a toothless man. Jkcnong, a small copper gong forming part of the gamnlan. Ukpudang, burong kcpuzdang, a kind of thrush mentioned in romances. Ikrabu, I. Ikbretut, uneven of sewing. Jckrika1, a large salver or tray. Ikrikam, an Indian cloth. Jkbrikil, batu kerikil, flints; pebbles.. Jkerong, kerong-kerong, the orifice through which water escapes from the scuppers; ikan kerong-kerong, a fish sebastes stolizke.

Jr6ruping, the scab over a healing wound-cf. Penang assault by a gang. KXsna, Skr. Khalik Ar. God the creator. Ikikir, a file, a grater; by metaphor miserly. Ikilan, Jav. Ikilas, a thong; a strap for pinioning. Icinchang, kinchang-kinchang, gadding about. Jkobak, peeling, unhusking; kobakckan, to peel. Jkok, a single yoke-cf. Kompini, Eur. Ikuasa, I. Belanda, the rabbit; k. Belanda; anak k. Ikudis, skin-disease causing scurf; mange.

Ikui, a brazier's mould. In that negotiation, the firm acquired a year Hak Guna Usaha leasing concession right, HGU from the government over customary land after obtaining written consent from representatives of the community. According to community representatives, this contract reflected an attempt by the firm to formally limit the activities of smallholder farmers while ensuring access to labor.

The processes through which agribusiness firms are able to access land to begin with are critical and complicated Hasudungan and Neilson First, agribusiness firms routinely construct a discourse around poor smallholder agricultural capacity and productivity in order to accumulate land and assert control over resources. To convince the government of the superiority of large-scale plantations over local agricultural systems, investors present local swidden cultivations as backward and unproductive Potter This provides a conducive environment for the subsequent lease negotiations between firms and the state at the district and national levels.

To then ensure optimal land access, agribusiness firms seek ways to negotiate contractual agreements that allow them greater direct control of upstream production sites. This means that agribusiness firms need to engage in active negotiations and bargaining with actors outside the value chain, including government and local communities, the latter primarily as gatekeepers of land but whose members often later participate directly in the value chain as either fruit suppliers or laborers.

Community consent emerges as a key milestone in ensuring access to land, but since negotiating with all the landholders is costly, time-consuming, and uncertain, firms inevitably choose to pursue contract negotiations mediated through a more limited number of customary elites Li Our fieldwork in multiethnic Village A, where a Dayak leader occupied the position of village head, found that the allure of promised future prosperity was an important factor in eliciting consent.

In this case, however, it led to later disappointment:. About 30 village leaders were invited to a comparative study in Riau. Yet those promises were misleading. What they promised was different from the current reality. Respondent J, Iban, Through these field trips and other activities, the firm expected key leaders in the village to convince others to agree to land transfers, and these leaders were often recruited for this specific purpose.

Through the successful recruitment of such local patrons as supporters of the firm, the likelihood of acquiescence from other community members was greatly increased, resulting in more secure access to the natural resources available on community lands. In these contested land deals, some customary Dayak elites rejected the contractual conditions while others became strong advocates in favor of the offered agreements, leading to sometimes-serious intra-community conflict.

One Dayak community member sold access rights to large tracts of land with the expectation that his children would be given supervisor-level jobs within the firm. The upstream influence of agribusiness firms within communities divided aspirations in ways that sometimes led to horizontal conflict and violence.

Another Dayak man revealed how he had been verbally abused as a result of his father-in-law opposing the firm contracts, the terms and conditions of which he felt were unclear. In another instance, it was recounted that a man who supported the firm ended up in a duel using a machete-like weapon known as mandau with another man who opposed it. The Iban man, whose frustration at his inability to assert his rights was palpable, was later sentenced to jail:.

My older brother was convicted by the law because of that conflict over the land boundary. He was prosecuted in Putussibau. Respondent N, Village C, This is often associated with a stronger buyer-driven governance structure within the chain. Gereffi emphasized how lead firms enact such governance within a chain, not necessarily through the direct ownership of upstream firms but through decentralized production settings, outsourcing, and indirect control. Both these Indonesian-owned conglomerates, for example, are manufacturers of diversified consumer products including cooking oil, while also engaging upstream with plantation production.

For the most part, these lead firms enact relatively strict supply chain traceability programs on third-party suppliers. On the GAR website, 2 the firm provides detailed information regarding third-party suppliers and its attempts to manage them.

Both Indofood Agri and Sinar Mas Agro Resources and Technology are important suppliers for the domestic market, for which they manufacture consumer products, while also exporting to various markets across Asia-Pacific and Europe. Specific norms around corporate social responsibility have emerged within the palm oil sector that in themselves constitute institutional forms that is, accepted patterns of behavior.

Lead firms enact interventions along the value chain primarily in an attempt to ensure long-term stability over palm oil supplies, which often involves upstream commitments to stimulate local development surrounding the mills SMART To meet their supply needs and consumer expectations , lead firms have funded the building of mills, roads, schools, and facilities around Kapuas Hulu.

Indofood Agri has initiated social investments through its Solidarity Programme IndoAgri , which delivers improved community health and education facilities in an explicit attempt to improve relationships with the local community of Village C. Such social infrastructure development has been replicated in Village A and Village B by other agribusiness firms to fulfill their corporate interests to integrate more productive and capable potential laborers in their supply chain.

Indeed, relatively high rates of satisfaction with education and health infrastructure were reported by respondents to our household survey, as presented in Fig. While an expanding corporate infrastructure program primarily serves strategic business interests, rural households with adequate capability assets can leverage this to configure diversified livelihood strategies where they effectively engage with multiple value chains simultaneously Bolwig et al.

For instance, with improved access to education and health care, some members of the local community are able to access better jobs on the plantations and elsewhere. In an interview with a younger, high-school-educated Dayak man, he explained that the ability to write, read, and understand basic numerical calculations allowed him to work as a field supervisor on a plantation and improve his overall economic situation.

Indeed, many community members have successfully upgraded their positions within the value chain to occupy more lucrative positions as collectors or middlemen, where they use the improved infrastructure to supply mills in Sintang, a processing hub farther down the Kapuas River. They act as local market conduits from smallholders to downstream value chain actors, and use their economic position to coordinate and increase smallholder production.

These chains continue to be effectively governed by lead firms, which create limiting institutions for participation, including through price and standard settings, although collectors also retain a degree of autonomy.

The characteristics of oil palm fruit have a powerful effect on the value chain structure and the relations between actors. Fresh fruit bunches generally need to be processed within 48 hours to maintain oil quality, and prices paid are severely discounted or rejected outright if delivery is delayed. A relatively capital-intensive processing mill will thus often be surrounded by a hinterland of producers who are virtually tied to it with few alternative marketing options, with resulting highly uneven power relations between the two sets of actors.

It can also have the effect of empowering transport operators who provide a critical service linking them together. During the period of fieldwork in , when general market prices for oil palm fruit in West Kalimantan were around IDR 1, per kilo, local middlemen in Village C would pay as little as IDR 1, per kilo due to these local dynamics. We observe how contractual deals for large-scale oil palm plantations can affect social relations among customary leaders as a result of firm-specific strategies to assert control over supplies.

Despite that disruption, the palm oil value chain functions in other ways to facilitate local participation in this value chain and in other economic activities. Previous research has emphasized that smallholding oil palm plantations can indeed be a way for local villagers to adopt commodity production largely on their own terms Cramb and Sujang ; Potter In our study, the business capabilities of some individuals were enhanced as a result of their exposure to corporate sustainability programs initiated by downstream value chain actors, especially improved social and physical infrastructure, enabling them to engage in new small business opportunities.

The palm oil value chain consists of various direct economic actors, including smallholder growers, collectors, agribusiness firms, processors, exporters, product manufacturers, supermarkets, and financial organizations. These actors and their value-adding activities constitute the fundamental input-output structure of the chain, with a buyer-driven governance structure dictated by the needs of lead firms that manifests itself in the various institutions described in the previous subsection.

In Kapuas Hulu, the Indonesian government, operating at various scales, is clearly an important driver of this broader institutional framework and acts to either promote or inhibit the spatial expansion of plantations. Meanwhile, various environmental and conservation interests, including international NGOs, have performed a further critical role in bringing public attention to the damaging environmental impacts of the palm oil industry, and their actions, agendas, and interests are reshaping the way smallholders engage with the palm oil sector and their ability to develop their own livelihood trajectories.

Ribot emphasized how state institutions shape access to resources, which in turn influences profit distribution along a value chain. In Kapuas Hulu, there are various state actors—including the local government, national and provincial land agencies, financial regulators, and conservation agencies—that shape the contours of industry expansion. National and local authorities facilitate the expansion of oil palm cultivation through improving labor supply including through transmigrasi schemes and by providing subsidies, loans, agricultural extension services, and infrastructure development.

Plantation expansion has been a key pillar of state policies through which to promote agricultural modernization in border areas such as Kapuas Hulu, further encouraging large-scale appropriation of land resources Hasudungan and Neilson BPN is the only state institution legally allowed to issue HGUs in Indonesia, although if the lease area is below 1, hectares, authority falls upon the provincial land agency.

Prior to gaining concession rights, firms are legally required to negotiate with local communities about their proposal to establish a plantation. In these situations, state agents often view swidden cultivation negatively while embracing and supporting the need to develop modern, large-scale plantations.

A frequent problem is that state agents overlook the informal, customary rights of swidden cultivators. Certain representatives of the state were quite explicit about their attitudes toward customary rights, which were seen to be subservient to state claims over land:. Here [West Kalimantan], customary rights do not exist. These would require satisfying formal requirements, such as the presence of local customary and collective rights.

In fact, these cannot be observed—they are just able to claim access to sacred forests to collect local resources. The firm was granted the [legal] concession based on the prior legal status of that being state land.

Such policies tend to create a regulatory dichotomy between state land and freehold land, which implicitly suggests an absence of informal rights or customary tenure. This false dichotomy has contributed to multiple conflicts, competing claims, and ultimately the ability of firm interests to access land at relatively low cost. In a presidential decree 4 established an independent authority, directly under the high-profile coordinating minister for economic affairs and known as Badan Pengelola Dana Perkebunan Kelapa Sawit Palm Oil Fund Management Agency, BPDPKS , to essentially channel loans and other support to the palm oil sector.

It was an extension of a previous program to provide micro-credit to smallholders. BPDPKS is financed from an industry levy imposed on palm oil exports, and in return it provides subsidized loans through state-owned banks and other support for research and development and replanting. Most of the actors provided with financial assistance were finance organizations, such as local banks and credit unions, that channelled the funds to farmers for accessing fertilizers, herbicides, and motorcycles for transporting fruit.

Agricultural assistance is provided also through the Directorate General of Estate Crops, which in provided the local community in Village B with planting material and fertilizers through sporadic projects. The local agricultural development office is also a conduit for the distribution of subsidized fertilizer, formally intended for use on local food crops. Swidden farmers are generally ineligible to access subsidized fertilizers. In contrast, nongovernmental organizations link oil palm expansion with the loss of biodiversity, soil erosion, greenhouse gas emissions, and the pollution of soils and waterways Levang et al.

These NGOs, furthermore, expand their focus to highlight negative social impacts in order to generate broader public opposition. In Silat Hilir, agribusiness firms were accused by one international NGO of exploiting child labor and paying low salaries while destroying rain forests and orangutan habitats Greenpeace This public opposition has included criticism of financial institutions for unethical investments in the palm oil sector.

Environmental organizations thereby also actively reconstruct the institutional environment of the chain at various scales. At the local level, NGOs have worked with some villagers to oppose oil palm and successfully reshape local opposition toward its expansion Acciaoli and Dewi In Village B the influence of NGOs was exerted through engagements between village activists and NGO staff, where the latter actively urged local villagers to reject oil palm expansion.

Community members in one village received pamphlets from a Jakarta-based NGO about the negative impacts of palm oil, which identified the lack of employment and dispossession resulting from palm oil development:. Oil palm plantations destroy local livelihoods.

The local community has been cultivating food crops for hundreds of years. Rotation and swidden cultivation in particular has allowed for the regrowing of forests. Palm oil development erased that subsistence food and other agroforestry incomes such as rattan, resin rubber, and pepper. Currently, we advocate the endorsement of customary rights in Kapuas Hulu. With regard to palm oil development, we ask the customary community to calculate the costs and benefits of accepting palm oil development.

We can conclude that the customary community received only 0. In fact, by working in their rubber fields they can use this cash income for their daily shopping needs. This approach, where environmental activists advocated protection of customary rights, gained favorable traction among local communities. Nonetheless, the inability of NGOs to differentiate between oil palm as a smallholder crop grown on terms set by community members and large-scale oil palm plantations meant that they often distanced themselves from prevailing community interests Levang et al.

In the pamphlet disseminated by activists, oil palm was linked to labor exploitation:. In the Indonesian palm oil sector, labor rights such as decent pay, freedom, and their ability to negotiate are suppressed. Agreements and expectations from palm oil firms about employment are rarely met.

Many people face a worse situation than before the arrival of oil palm. This argument seemed to ignore the reality of active community participation in the palm oil sector across Kapuas Hulu, both as smallholders and as plantation workers, and the mutual existence of palm oil laboring and swidden farming.

From another perspective, the oppositional stance taken by activists tended to raise local expectations about the prospects of alternative livelihood improvements, which were rarely realized in practice Acciaoli and Dewi While the local community shifts to other crops, rubber plays an important role to sustain household economies. While activists insist on the economic and social viability of rubber, the local community views it as having declining importance and at least at the time of fieldwork being far less important than either pepper or oil palm.

Farmers tended to harvest rubber only during periods when they urgently needed cash, as suggested by one farmer:. Even though I have rubber, I have not yet tapped it. These days I am more comfortable cultivating padi swidden and working as an oil palm laborer. I follow other people to work as an oil palm laborer. Previously, I got rid of the [rubber] bark and would harvest it. Indeed, aspirations and monetary needs in West Kalimantan had been growing, and this resulted in greater interest in education, health care, and goods such as motorbikes and electronic equipment Levang et al.

Involvement in the palm oil economy appeared to offer realistic opportunities to meet these desires and needs through increased involvement in the cash economy. In areas that had rejected oil palm cultivation, such as the communities surrounding the buffer conservation areas of Embaloh Hulu and Batang Lupar subdistricts, local people were frequently confused about what livelihood alternatives could be realistically pursued given broader structural constraints.

In these communities, which had closer relationships with various environmental activists from Jakarta and Putussibau, local people were more likely to complain about their economic situation and the difficulties they faced in meeting their basic needs. At the global scale, exposure by NGOs of the relationship between deforestation and oil palm expansion has had profound effects on the institutional environment of the palm oil value chain.

These include the setting up of the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil in as a voluntary certification standard that has established new behavioral norms for firms seeking access to ethically aware consumers. This standard demands, amongst other social and environmental requirements, that plantation firms obtain prior informed consent from customary landholders. This has resulted in slowly shifting institutional norms on the ground in Kapuas Hulu.

International finance organizations are also under increasing pressure to obtain independent verification that their investments are not contributing to environmental and social degradation. As a final example, the European Parliament responded to consumer and NGO pressure by issuing a resolution in to phase out biofuels made from palm oil, a decision that has had profound effects on trade and was, at the time of writing, strongly contested by the Indonesian government.

It can be seen that the broader institutional framework of the palm oil sector, most notably the influence of the state and environmental NGOs, created conditions that influenced—sometimes in contradictory ways—the nature of community engagement with the sector.

In some instances these institutions provided opportunities for positive engagement that could be strategically leveraged by individuals and organizations, while at other times they could shut down negotiations. Furthermore, these institutions were often powerfully reinforced through the discursive interventions of these actors in a battle for the attitudes and perceptions of local communities exposed to the palm oil economy. The Ibanic Dayak community in Kapuas Hulu has complex customary cultural institutions that manage natural resources and address conflicts Yasmi et al.

For instance, in Ibanic customary culture the community lives in a longhouse consisting of 10 to 30 households, with a longhouse head called the tue rumah. During the s and s, Village B consisted of 12 households living in one longhouse, while Village A had 20 to 30 households in a longhouse. To demarcate the territory between longhouses, it would be customary for communally managed agroforests called tembawang to be established.

The tue rumah imposed sanctions on any outsiders collecting resources without their approval, and the negotiation of territorial claims among longhouses was decided based on the negotiation between the tue rumah and higher leaders of several longhouses, known as patih. Incorporation within palm oil value chains has been associated with a shift in preferences for individual, rather than longhouse, residency.

In Village B, scarce timber resources combined with past conflicts among customary leaders also contributed to the decline of longhouse unions and their accompanying institutions. Here, the role of the tue rumah to regulate land and labor access has been diminishing, such that many Dayak communities now depend on customary decisions to be made at the higher level of patih. While longhouses are often important sites for various social gatherings as we observed in villages where less oil palm was grown , the Iban community in Village B was not really functioning in this way, due to increased intra-community conflicts.

Conflicts within Dayak communities were frequently perceived by local migrants and non-Dayaks as a sign of weak customary institutions that would increase the ability of firms to gain further access to resources.

Customary institutions once had a significant influence on the regulations of subsistence-based swidden cultivation in allocating land access and facilitating reciprocal labor exchange. For instance, villagers would obtain exclusive rights to ancestral land after it was transferred by their grandparents. Farmers would take the risk and invest their time and energy to open up forest areas for swiddening, but only after gaining local approval from the tue rumah. Clearing primary forest, in particular, posed major risks, including dangers of encountering crocodiles, sun bears, or venomous snakes.

In addition, the tue rumah would also monitor labor reciprocity among the households within the longhouse, and they would impose customary sanctions on any reluctance to appropriately engage in labor exchanges. Ibanic Dayak culture and institutions are strongly associated with swidden cultivation.

Dove highlighted past studies of swidden cultivation that demonstrated its economic and cultural importance for Dayaks in terms of inheriting collective norms and ensuring food production. These cultural practices continued even as rubber became integrated as a complementary cash crop alongside a subsistence crop economy for Dayak households Dove Nevertheless, external influences associated with oil palm development have changed local attitudes toward swidden cultivation.

In the previous discussion of government institutions, national and local elites enacted regulatory interventions that restricted local swidden-linked burning practices. Their assumption was that the swidden cultivators were incapable and reluctant to participate in oil palm development. In fact, a new tentative coexistence seems to be emerging between swidden farming and oil palm at the case sites.

In Village B and Village C, some farmers have largely incorporated oil palm cultivation into their swidden plots, but with a marked generational pattern. Older informants revealed their continued commitment to swidden land, while at the same time they had begun to embrace oil palm cultivation. Yet, for younger Dayaks, swidden cultivation is often seen as a mostly unproductive livelihood strategy and one with decreasing social value.

The generational shift was explained by a Sebaruk farmer:. I work in a palm oil firm here. I am not involved in swidden cultivation, but my parents are. However, I am involved in oil palm and rubber cultivation. The oil palm [fruit] has not yet been harvested, but the rubber has.

For me, swidden cultivation is insufficient for us. Swidden cultivation is poorly valued by younger farmers due to its inability to generate significant cash income and due to the influences of urban lifestyles and mass consumerism as also described by Cramb et al. With better formal education and training, youths are abandoning swidden farming and participating more in various livelihood activities linked to oil palm.

In Village B, a year-old Iban man described the process through which he abandoned swidden cultivation and embraced oil palm cultivation:. In I went to Lubok Antu to visit my relatives in Malaysia. One of them shared his story about the unpleasant experience of planting pepper, rubber, swidden, and running a local shop.

A Chinese man persuaded my brother in Malaysia to plant oil palm, saying it was more beneficial than pepper. I then took oil palm seeds. I started to plant despite the warnings of local villagers. Nowadays I no longer practice swidden cultivation, as I expect more from the oil palm harvest. Respondent YE, Village B, Dayaks in Village A shared similar opinions about swidden cultivation.

For example, a well-educated Dayak man in his mids explained how swidden cultivation had largely become irrelevant to his livelihood as he instead invested cash resources into rental properties. Another Iban man in Village A, in his mids, had moved away from swidden cultivation to local trading after receiving a university education in Java.

I am a local trader but not a farmer. I purchase my own food, as I cannot depend on this local society. In Village C, Dayaks are a minority compared to Malays and other migrants, who often aggressively criticize customary swidden farming by Dayaks, which they claim is destructive and polluting.

A local Malay leader explained:. I need to explain the effects to indigenous farmers. I already told them the smog will go overseas [to Malaysia]. I did not blame the swidden cultivation, but just the way land is converted through slash-and-burn practices. We observed little progress [in government attempts] to reduce slash-and-burn farming.

It took two months to socialize that to farmers. A decline in customary resource tenure institutions has also facilitated a further powerful mechanism driving exclusion and unequal land possession among villagers—that of the market itself. In addition to contractual deals negotiated by firms, growing numbers of villagers from Village A and Silat Hilir have become engaged in land markets associated with oil palm, such that increasing economic differentiation has emerged.

It has been reported elsewhere in Southeast Asia how the local transition to perennial cash crops resulted in an increasing pattern of individualized land tenure and the weakening of community governance Cramb et al. This was observed, for instance, in both Village B and Village C, where customary institutions that had traditionally demarcated village boundaries based on natural signs such as rocks, rivers, and trees obtained from village elders were now being challenged as the physical landscape itself was transformed through oil palm.

A Sebaruk man explained how he preferred using GPS and a letter of consent from the village head Surat Keterangan Tanah, SKT to demarcate land boundaries when purchasing swidden land from other villagers. In addition to an increasing trend toward perennial cash crops, declining traditional practices of labor exchange have also been observed Cramb et al.

In the past, reciprocal labor exchange arrangements, known as kabanbelayan among the Iban Sather , were employed within longhouse communities to overcome labor bottlenecks during planting, weeding, and harvesting times Dove When the arrangement was strictly enforced, not even material returns or surplus rice was allowed to be substituted for labor. In Iban culture, cooperation between local community members is particularly useful when it comes to labor-intensive activities such as felling trees and harvesting subsistence food crops Cramb In contemporary Kapuas Hulu, however, instead of complying with traditional labor exchange rules, many instances of labor exchange now involve monetary contributions, as reported by a Dayak man in Village C who paid IDR 80, per day for local assistance on his swidden, and an Iban Dayak in Village B who paid IDR 50, per day for outside labor to assist with the rice harvest.

For perennial cash crops, labor arrangements are almost universally based on monetary exchanges; in both Village B and Village C daily labor was reportedly paid up to IDR , to harvest oil palm fruit. Across Southeast Asia there has been a trend toward off-farm livelihood diversification, but often as part of a multipronged strategy to continue farming or as a strategy to accumulate resources and invest in larger smallholding plots Rigg et al. Land dispossession due to plantation development has been reported elsewhere, leading to highly unequal access to land and processes of agrarian differentiation Hall et al.

Similar outcomes were observed in Village B, as explained by a Dayak Iban a single mother :. The advantage of working in palm oil mills is that I can earn money while still engaged in swidden cultivation. I work from 7 in the morning to 2 in the afternoon. Afterward, I continue my swidden work.

Fifteen years ago, women could not seek a financial income apart from swidden cultivation. Yet I can make it to work on the palm oil plantation. While work on the oil palm plantation did not provide the abovementioned single mother with significant money to meet all her needs, she found this work beneficial because it allowed her to flexibly meet her daily cash economic needs. Customary institutions in Kapuas Hulu such as those linked to swidden cultivation once played a critical role in determining livelihood aspirations and engagement with new economic opportunities.

These institutions are still important for some Dayak communities, especially the older generation, and they can be seen to have mediated the integration of these communities into the palm oil economy. Yet, over time, the influence of these institutions has tended to evolve and indeed decline. Local institutional adaptation is a key feature of the social landscape in Kapuas Hulu and has resulted in new systems of resource access that frequently build upon past customary institutions in a largely path-dependent way.

The ability of communities to draw legitimacy and strength from these institutions appears to be a key determinant of social outcomes arising from engagement with the palm oil economy. This research presents the complex multi-scalar institutional environment emerging around the palm oil value chain as it manifests itself in Kapuas Hulu. While we recognize that livelihood outcomes for rural households are often site specific, our study has highlighted the multi-scalar sets of institutions that intervene in the relationship between agrarian communities and the palm oil sector.

We have further demonstrated how livelihood change and rural development outcomes can be helpfully analyzed, and indeed understood, through a global value chain lens, especially one that is sensitive to the broader institutional environment of the chain. In this case study, large-scale oil palm development has resulted in land appropriation and the exclusion of some individuals from accessing traditional land resources.

This has occurred as a result of various mechanisms, including the regulatory processes associated with spatial planning, formalizing private concessions HGUs , constructing discursive strategies, and establishing patronage relationships with local customary elites.

While local communities have, at times, been able to call on external institutions to mobilize support for their struggle against land appropriation, they are generally engaged in a negotiating space with highly unequal power relations.

National and local elites have more successfully configured alternative strategies to incorporate regulations, force, discursive constructions, and market pressures to achieve access to land to borrow from the powers of exclusion presented by Hall et al. The outcome of this process has been a large-scale landscape transformation across Kapuas Hulu away from a mosaic of forests, agroforests, and swidden land toward mostly monocultural oil palm plantations, even as this process remains incomplete.

The process of allocating large-scale concessions combines regulations and discursive narratives to accommodate the interests of lead firms in global value chains. These interests are able to concentrate land resources into their hands, or at least their supply chain, through regulatory mechanisms that ensure this is achieved at relatively low cost.

They rely heavily on negotiating and networking with various national and local elites within the state apparatus who support their desire to encourage a shift away from swidden-based land practices. With such formal regulatory support, plantation firms can secure land access and exert pressure on customary institutions to facilitate resource access. The degradation of customary institutions was also influenced by competing aspirations among Dayak communities themselves to reject or accept firm land contracts, and was ultimately associated with an increase in market-based land transactions a relatively new institution and subsequent loss of indigenously controlled land.

While there has been a countermovement by environmental activists and other NGOs to recognize customary rights and to reject oil palm expansion, this countermovement has largely failed to consider the reality that many community members are actively embracing the crop and voluntarily engaging with the broader oil palm economy. Many swidden farmers expressed their disappointment with environmental advocacy groups, since they had been largely unable to generate alternative income-generating activities for the local community.

As a result, many of these farmers have established their own oil palm smallholdings to secure a cash income. In the current broader context of the Indonesian agrarian political economy and the institutional environment described in this article , there appears to be limited room for maneuver for many rural households beyond the palm oil sector—at least in Kapuas Hulu.

While agribusiness firms are generally able to increase their control over land through various contractual agreements, there is another associated process of establishing palm oil related infrastructure. This infrastructure development provides some albeit limited choice and improved access to local inhabitants, so that they can engage with the larger value chain that reaches beyond Kapuas Hulu, and often in quite beneficial ways.

Local actors occupy different positions in the value chain in order to improve market access and strengthen their social and economic position. The broader market access associated with global palm oil value chain interventions encourages more local engagement with smallholding palm plantations, as found also by previous smallholding oil palm studies Cramb ; Potter Our approach of examining the broader institutional environment of the GVC for palm oil generates insights into the possibilities for reforming governance structures in ways that might allow community engagement to occur on terms more amenable to community interests.

Our research findings also have implications for understanding agrarian change and rural development trajectories in Indonesia. Smallholder households are clearly not just functioning as passive objects of development assistance or corporate accumulation, but they are actively configuring new roles as producers and broader agents within the local economy.

However, their attempts to assert a vision for appropriate rural development pathways in this case are ultimately dependent on their capacity to engage with, and actively reshape, the broader institutional environment of the palm oil value chain. Efforts to promote rural development should consider a much wider set of leverage points and actors embedded at different scales within an institutional environment that is continually under construction.

Research Publications Acciaoli, G. Opposition to Oil Palm Plantations. Cramb and J. McCarthy, pp. Singapore: NUS Press. Bolwig, S. Development Policy Review 28 2 : — Budidarsono, S. Bogor: World Agroforestry Centre. Chain Reaction Research. Colchester, M. Cramb, R. Cairns, pp. London and New York: Routledge. Human Ecology 37 3 : — Journal of Peasant Studies 40 1 : — Davis, L.

Institutional Change and American Economic Growth. London: Cambridge University Press. Dove, M. Berlin: Mouton. Dunn, K. Second Edition, pp. Melbourne: Oxford University Press. Elmhirst, R. Colfer, B. Basnett, and E. Marlene, pp. Fold, N. In The Economics of Chocolate , edited by M. Squicciarini and J. Swinnen, pp. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gereffi, G. Stallings, pp. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Retailers Shape Overseas Production Networks. Gereffi and M. Korzeniewicz, pp. Westport: Praeger. Hall, D. Hassler, M. Commodity Chains. Kitchin and N. Thrift, pp. Amsterdam: Elsevier. Hasudungan, A. Revista Nera 23 51 : — Leonald, L. Deakin, M. Kshatriya, and T. Sunderland, pp. Levang, P. Li, T. CIFOR occasional paper. McCarthy, J. Journal of Peasant Studies 37 4 : — Stanford: Stanford University Press.

World Development 40 3 : — Meinzen-Dick, R. Legal Pluralism and Dynamic Property Rights. Neilson, J. West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell. Economic Geography 94 4 : — Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Potter, L. Where Are the Swidden Fallows Now? Bissonnette, S. Bernard, R. De Koninck, and L. Potter, pp. Ribot, J. Development and Change 29 2 : — Rigg, J. Journal of Rural Studies — Sather, C. Fox and C.

Sather, pp. Canberra: ANU Press. Yasmi, Y. International Forestry Review 9 2 : — Media Articles Dara Aziliya Bisnis Indonesia Daily. April 5. Paganini, Pietro. Jakarta Post. November Corporate Reports Golden Agri-Resources. GAR Grievance List. March Perjanjian kerjasama pembangunan dan pengelolaan dan kebun kemitraan [Contract for the development and management of partnership plantations]. Golden Agri-Resources, Singapore. Previous studies on transnational media have emphasized transnational media organizations and tended to ignore the role of cross-border content, especially in a non-Western context.

This study aims to fill theoretical gaps within this scholarship by providing an analysis of the Southeast Asian media sphere, focusing on Indonesia and Malaysia in a historical context—transnational media flow before The two neighboring nations of Indonesia and Malaysia have many things in common, from culture to language and religion.

This study not only explores similarities in the reception and appropriation of transnational content in both countries but also investigates why, to some extent, each had a different attitude toward content produced by the other. It also looks at how governments in these two nations control the flow of transnational media content. Focusing on broadcast media, the study finds that cross-border media flow between Indonesia and Malaysia was made possible primarily in two ways: 1 illicit or unintended media exchange, and 2 legal and intended media exchange.

Illicit media exchange was enabled through the use of satellite dishes and antennae near state borders, as well as piracy. Legal and intended media exchange was enabled through state collaboration and the purchase of media rights; both governments also utilized several bodies of laws to assist in controlling transnational media content. Based on our analysis, there is a path of transnational media exchange between these two countries. We also found Malaysians to be more accepting of Indonesian content than vice versa.

Keywords : Nusantara, Indonesia, Malaysia, transnational media, cross-border content, broadcast media. The effect of globalization on national media systems has encouraged various countries to reconsider the effectiveness of their media policy. While the presence of foreign media content is not new for most nations, the intrusion of material produced by other countries has long been considered a national threat Crofts Wiley ; Cohen This is more so in states that aim to protect their national identities from the infiltration of foreign cultures, which are viewed as unsuitable for local audiences, via imported media content.

Today, with the proliferation of the Internet, Indonesia and Malaysia are expressing concerns over the media flow from foreign countries through global channels such as Netflix, Hulu, Amazon Prime, and Viu, among others. Notwithstanding the current reality, where global media companies like Netflix have already infiltrated Malaysia and Indonesia through the Internet, this paper aims to provide a historical overview of transnational content in both countries before More data on this topic will help to cross-examine the significance of country and regional studies from the perspective of global communication and media studies Flew and Waisbord Additionally, this research hopes to assist in providing insights into prognosticating reactions from both governments to trends in global media consumption, based on policies implemented by both countries in the past decade.

The relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia has always been defined based on the idea of serumpun kinship , the sharing of racial and religious affinity Islam , linguistic similarity, geographical proximity in the Malay Archipelago or Nusantara , and a shared history Khalid and Yacob Cross-border flow of media content eventually became a political debate in Indonesia and Malaysia Mohamad Rizal , but what influenced the laws and regulations put in place to deal with this issue remains unanswered.

Thus, we argue that comparing the media regulations between Indonesia and Malaysia would further explain what factors determined their decisions in media policy-making processes, especially their critical stance toward Western media content. We also look at the media exchange between Indonesia and Malaysia and investigate the channels of transnational media in these two states in the decades up to Finally, this study also explores factors influencing the acceptance of cross-border media content in both countries.

For this study we used a historical method, focusing on the comparison of media policies in Indonesia and Malaysia and how these countries developed their strategy on the flow of transnational media content.

Among the secondary data we used were past publications, government reports, as well as online databases. This paper aims to answer three research questions: 1 How was the practice of transnational media content flow in Indonesia and Malaysia before ? The discussion is focused on broadcast media before It is essential to also understand that, despite the objectives, this paper does not aim to measure the acceptance level of media content in Malaysia and Indonesia.

We aim to provide insights on matters related to the practice of transnational media flow and government approaches to cross-border content, and to explore potential factors influencing the acceptance of transnational media content in both countries. With globalization, societies are becoming more transnational. Globalization also creates problems that cannot be handled at the level of nation-states, and this forces governments to think at the supranational level Kearney Globalization can be illustrated by the increasing cross-border activities, from interactions among people from different parts of the world through social media platforms to people in different locations enjoying similar content provided by global media-services providers like Netflix.

While these transnational phenomena cannot be simplified as logical consequences of the increasing popularity of global media widely accessed by global audiences, it is somewhat difficult to diminish the impact of media on the advancement of globalization.

As a result, the transnational flow of media content can also be seen as one of the effects of globalization. Edward Herman and Robert McChesney explained that significant changes are taking place within society and in our relationship with media due to the influence of global media. These changes include increasing cross-border flows of media content as well as a growing number of transnational media organizations.

However, the authors also warned of the negative consequences of global media, mainly an increase in commercialization and centralized control over media. On the one hand, thanks to the globalization of media, many people in underdeveloped countries can easily watch high-quality programs produced by television stations in developed nations.

On the other hand, the infiltration of transnational media content, mostly from Western countries, is seen as a threat to national cultures. Even the dominance of news content from the Western world through global media into Third World countries like Malaysia and Indonesia has often been perceived as an attack on the free flow of information McBride Additionally, within the perspective of cultural imperialism, the international flow of communication is seen as favoring industrialized nations and threatening sociocultural values of developing countries McBride ; Kraidy In some states, foreign television programs have been accused of promoting consumerism Paek and Pan Even though policy makers in different countries have varying attitudes toward the presence of global media, governments in many developing nations tend to exhibit hostility toward unwanted transnational media content.

One of the most interesting debates concerning the threat of global media and transnational flows of communication took place during the UNESCO meeting in Kenya in During the initiation of the New World Information and Communication Order, a debate session hosted at the UNESCO meeting, some countries argued over whether the advancement of transnational media flows would be positive.

According to Marwan Kraidy , Western countries, which had more advanced media industries, argued that the free flow of information should be seen as positive, while the other nations did not agree and were afraid that liberalization of the flow of information would benefit only Western countries McBride Even today it is argued that there is an imbalance in the transnational flow of information, especially since media content tends to flow from developed nations to developing ones.

However, this relationship has not always been stable and is bittersweet. When Malaysia was formed through the amalgamation of the Federation of Malaya, Singapore, Sabah, and Sarawak in , Indonesia, led by President Sukarno, was not happy with the idea.

However, Konfrontasi ended with Indonesia finally acknowledging the formation of Malaysia. In more recent times, tensions between these two countries expanded to issues of territorial boundaries, Indonesian illegal immigrants, ill treatment of Indonesian workers in Malaysia, human trafficking, and the infamous annual forest fires in Indonesia that resulted in a terrible haze over Peninsular Malaysia and Singapore for more than a decade from the mids Kanapathy ; Kompas in Heryanto ; Killias ; Elias However, despite the endless conflicts between these two countries, governments on both sides worked hard to arrive at a better understanding and a more stable diplomatic relationship.

This could be seen through the efforts by both governments to strengthen bilateral ties. Mahathir Mohamad, he and Indonesian President Joko Widodo pledged to improve the relationship between their countries and focus on resolving outstanding border issues, enhancing protection and welfare for migrant workers, and potentially reviving the old plan of an ASEAN car project Chan As in many Southeast Asian countries, the broadcasting system in Indonesia was introduced during the colonial period.

Under Dutch colonial rule, radio was used to relay messages from the Netherlands to the Dutch East Indies as well as provide entertainment for colonial elites Kitley When Japan took over, radio became a propaganda tool for the colonizers, with Japanese programs delivered to local audiences. When Indonesia gained its independence in , radio eventually became the primary tool to broadcast nationalistic and revolutionary messages around the country.

The initial reason for this was that Sukarno, the Indonesian president at the time, wanted to deliver the image of Indonesia as a modern country to the whole region Kitley As the host of the Asian Games in , Indonesia wanted to broadcast this sporting event to other Asian countries transnationally.

Consequently, TVRI was overwhelmed by American television programs: it was much cheaper to broadcast those than to produce local programs. He prohibited broadcast media from delivering political messages, which in turn encouraged the growing popularity of entertainment content.

Music, both local and Western, dominated radio shows at that time. While Suharto still allowed national television to broadcast limited transnational programs, such as American TV shows, he prohibited TVRI from airing advertisements over concerns that television commercials might promote consumerism Ade Armando The Indonesian government tended to be permissive with imported programs due to business reasons.

However, on some occasions government officials still warned the public not to be influenced by Western cultures that were promoted through foreign television programs. One of the reasons why Suharto permitted a private television network was to distract Indonesian viewers from foreign broadcasting Ade Armando It seems that the increasing use of satellite dishes at that time encouraged local audiences to access international broadcasts illegally.

Through shared signals from a satellite dish, even people in a small village could watch overseas television programs that were not available on local broadcasting channels. Therefore, rather than further control the use of satellite dishes, which was seen as impractical, the government tried to attract local audiences by introducing private television channels.

The strict Suharto government finally fell after the countrywide Reformasi protest movement in Films that were deemed as sensitive or critical of the government were publicly broadcast, and various new creative products could be shared with international audiences. However, some critics argued that although there were improvements in terms of cultural expression, some media content was still heavily censored Sen and Hill , such as pornography, extreme violence, and content deemed too critical of the Indonesian government or its policies.

In Malaysia, too, the media was tightly controlled by the ruling power. This resulted in minimal media freedom in the country and not much variety in media content available to the public Kim ; McDaniel ; Mohd Sani ; George ; Iga ; Willnat et al. It also led to media monopoly. Unlike free-to-air channels, Astro satellite service offers television channels and 20 radio stations that include all free-to-air channels along with international channels such as HBO, Cinemax, and Fox Astro Over the years Astro has received multiple criticisms not only from subscribers but also from local politicians, even though it provides so many interesting channels Khairil Ashraf Despite the negative feedback about Astro since it began broadcasting in , the satellite service provider has never had serious competition in the market.

With strong demand for a variety of channels, the people have only one legal option for satellite service—although many, especially in the rural areas, have opted to purchase unregistered illegal satellite dishes. Using such satellite dishes, they can receive multiple channels from outside the country without having to pay monthly fees; plus the content is not filtered by any government body, which allows users to enjoy original uncensored content.

Malaysia has always been strict when it comes to filtering media content from foreign countries, particularly content originating and produced in Western nations. Media content that is seen as inappropriate, especially opposing Eastern and Islamic cultures and values, is banned from public viewing. The Film Censorship Board of Malaysia under the Ministry of Home Affairs plays a vital role in deciding what content can be broadcast in the Malaysian media.

Film censorship laws, specifically the Film Censorship Act , 2 not only filter and oversee exported content but also oversee the production and showing of local films Wan Mahmud et al. According to Wan Amizah Wan Mahmud , the censorship system in Malaysia was not initially created by the Malaysian government per se but was one of the effects of British colonization.

It is believed that the main legacy of the British Empire in the field of media was not the craft of producing films, but the outline of the censorship system Van der Heide , which can still be seen today. It is also important to note that the Censorship Board reviews not only films but also trailers, newsreels, posters, advertisements, and short comedy films Wan Mahmud et al. Hence, in order for local and international producers to have their content nationally broadcast, it is crucial for them to follow the guidelines provided by the Censorship Board.

Some of the media laws in Indonesia and Malaysia that could be used to oversee transnational media content can be referred to in Table 2 below. For instance, in both countries banned the Hollywood film Noah claiming it went against Islamic beliefs Nathan With Islam being the official religion in both countries, the Malaysian and Indonesian governments pay extra attention to any content that can affect Islamic values.

In an Indonesian filmmaker, Garin Nugroho, received death threats for his film Memories of My Body , which portrays a male dancer exploring his sexuality and gender identity. Historically, in many countries uncontrolled media flow has been viewed as a threat to national sovereignty and has shaped media policies Hardt and Negri ; Flew Information flow from developed countries into Third World countries threatens the latter as foreign media content effectively surpasses the jurisdiction and authority of nation-states, eventually challenging the notion of national sovereignty and its effectiveness.

In this section, we highlight some examples of how media content flows between Indonesia and Malaysia, with a specific focus on broadcast materials such as films, TV dramas, radio, and music. Transnational media content flows between Malaysia and Indonesia mainly through two modes of transmission: 1 illicit or unintended media exchange, including, especially at the national borders, the availability of illegal satellite dishes and DVD dealerships to accommodate local demand for foreign content; and 2 legal and intended media exchange refer to Fig.

The intended media exchange discussed here focuses on content from Malaysia and the island of Java, where the Indonesian capital—Jakarta—is located and extensive use of the official Bahasa Indonesia rather than the Javanese language is recorded Poedjosoedarmo Due to the diversity of languages in the Indonesian archipelago Goebel ; , media consumption in the country also varies Sen and Hill Most media companies and government agencies are located in Java, but there are some also in Bali and Sumatra Nugroho et al.

In Indonesia and Malaysia, one of the catalysts facilitating transnational media content was satellite TV.

AUBURN FLORIDA STATE BETTING PREDICTIONS TODAY

Elmo's light; an ignis fatuius taken by sea-faring Malays to be an evil spirit. Jbrupeh, mgnj9rupeh, to add a band or layer to the top of anything so as to increase its height. Jibrael, Ar. Jima', Ar. Jumaat, Ar. K ka, I. Ikabut, cloudy, misty, indistinct; mist; hilang k. Ikacha, glass the material ; roda 7c. China, the pea-nut arachis hypogcea ; also k. Jgpun, the soy bean soya hispida ; k. Muhammadan; also kapir. Batek, Javanese painted sarongs; k. Jalor a bamboo gong.

I:kalam, I. Kedah kalang ayam, a hen-roost. Ikalas, I. Dutch room; a cabin in a ship. BWlanda, a sheep; k. Bgnggala, a large imported goat; k. Kantong, Ch. Kapri, Caffre, African, Negro. Balanda, chalk; k. Karun, Ar. Koral the enemy of Moses , believed by Malays to have been a man of enormous wealth whose treasure is new buried in the earth for wizard to find.

Dyak head hunting. Ik]dilai, kachang kedelai, a plant phaseolus mungo. Uclana, I. Ikblara, ikan lkilara, a fish unidentifled. Lklasi, I. Z ates leuciscus. Mblindan, strong sewing thread. X6ling, "Kling," a name applied to all immigrants from the Coromandel coast but sometimes limited to Muhammadan immigrants from that coast the others being called Orang Hindu ; orang K. U3liru, confusion of thought; muddle-headedness; pikir k. Tklodak, thunder-cf. Jk1lok, a curve; an arc; a semicircle; birkalok-kBlok, cut in semi-circles of a border -cf.

Jc6manig, an evil spirit affecting newborn children. Ukmpang, a sort of dug-out used on rivers. Jkmpong, shrunken about the cheeks as a toothless man. Jkcnong, a small copper gong forming part of the gamnlan. Ukpudang, burong kcpuzdang, a kind of thrush mentioned in romances. Ikrabu, I. Ikbretut, uneven of sewing.

Jckrika1, a large salver or tray. Ikrikam, an Indian cloth. Jkbrikil, batu kerikil, flints; pebbles.. Jkerong, kerong-kerong, the orifice through which water escapes from the scuppers; ikan kerong-kerong, a fish sebastes stolizke. Jr6ruping, the scab over a healing wound-cf. Penang assault by a gang. KXsna, Skr. Khalik Ar. God the creator. Ikikir, a file, a grater; by metaphor miserly.

Ikilan, Jav. Ikilas, a thong; a strap for pinioning. Icinchang, kinchang-kinchang, gadding about. Jkobak, peeling, unhusking; kobakckan, to peel. Jkok, a single yoke-cf. Kompini, Eur. Ikuasa, I. Belanda, the rabbit; k. Belanda; anak k. Ikudis, skin-disease causing scurf; mange. Ikui, a brazier's mould. Xkuini, the wild mango mangifera foetida.

Jkunchup, closing up or folding up of an umbrella or of any similar object which shrinks on itself but is not rolled round itself like a flag ; knmbang k. Kuran, Ar. Xuripan, an old kingdom in Java, the home of Sira Panji. Inlbtu, a tick; tindas k. L la, Ar. Allah, the curse of God; laanatan, accursed. China, a pepper piper chaba ; 1. II, halliards. Lanun, Ilanun the name of a pirati. IIa great gate; a main entrance; lawangan, id. Isok-l1sak, to rustle.

Umpat, fresh, jovial, genial. Dutch a cord, a twist of cord-like patterns in carving. M ma', mother familiar. Xajuj, Ar. Wpstaka, extreme ill-luck. Maseh, I. Al-maseh, the Messiah, Jesus. Masehi, Ar. Christian, Protestant. Islan or m. Mglayu, to become a Muhammadan;. Zlmas, death by suffocation or drowning; n.

Maulia, Ar. Mllayu, Malayan, Malay; Muhammadan; anak M. Iniltua1, father-ia-law; mother-inlaw. MXsuara, Skr. Maheswara; Siva. Mikael, Ar. Iebat, a drooping moustache. Misir, Ar. Muharram, Ar. Musa, Ar. S marau, the dry season; m. Muslim, Ar. Moslem, Muhammadan,. N, Ng, Ny naam, Ar. Ibrahim, Abraham; n. Idris; Enoch; n. Isa, Jesus; nabi-nabi, the starfish of seven points-cf. Allah, what God has forbidden. Arabic in.

Nasrani, Ar. Ottu, Ar. Ogah, Hind. Ogok, stinginess. I have it! Dutch a watchman. Melayu, a Malay; kata o. Dutch the Dutch " pole" as a measure of length. Ilngan, the upper arm; pangkalan, a landing place; the point where a traveller leaves the sea for a land journey, or vice-versa. The feeler or antenna of an insect. Dutch , a placard. Pfndawa, Skr. O:elam, id. Prranchis, Port. Pulau P. Inggeris, British rule;. Indian, Persian, Indonesian. Frank, European, Portuguese.

Allah taala didalam Kuran, the word of God revealed in the Koran; also firman. Ilsi, pale through anaemia; p. Snangis p. R raba, groping or feeling about with the hands; mgraba, to grope; to fondle. Lord of God ; Ilahi R. Rabi-U4-awal and Rabi-. Rajab, Ar.

Taksi, I. Ssri Rama, the Hindu demi-god Rama. Ramadzan, Ar. II om pang-ramping, tattered and torn. Tang, tanah rang, a rice-field banked and previously cultivated, but temporarily lying fallow. Ranjuna, Skr. Allah, God's apostle, Muhammad. Kawi the earth; jaya ning-rat, victorious in the land; conqueror of the world. Kuripan, the Prince of Kuripan, Panji. III, a large tree unidentified.

Trbdang, baking or frying; marin. Aitngap, onom. IIdizzy with excitement; light-headed or feverish with pleasure. Mlayu 'roman, romanised Malay. Rum, Ar. II, nruLnjang, to thrust blindly at what we cannot see. S sa, a prefix expressing or suggesting unity; one; a; forming or consti. Allah, a war in God's cause; a holy war. Xabtu, Ar. Safar, Ar. BWlanda, arrowroot. Saidi, Lord God ; ya S.

Salla, Ar. Samsam, a name given to a mixed half-Siamese race inhabiting the northern parts of the Peninsula. Chinese alcoholic spirit. Sanat, Ar. Bidasari, Puspa-sari, Tunjong-sari, etc. Pgrai, Province Wellesley from Penang ; seberangkan, to ferry over; mznyeblrang, to cross over. Sl1ampuri, kain Slampuri, Seram. S61ang, I. Sblasa, Ar. Singapu'ra, the straits of Singapore; s.

Sbigut, winding in and out as persons making their way through a crowd. Sblimut, sheeting, enfolding; kain s. Dutch end, conclu. China, Chinesetrousers; s. S6mang, a name given to Negrito aborigines in the country near the headwaters of the Perak river. II bbrsenam, to stretch oneself on waking. Senayan, Ar. Sjpfrba, Skr. S6randib, Pers. Jsrangkak, a girdle of thorns put round the trunk of a tree to prevent thieves climbing it.

Jsrau, I. Asraya, I. Sbrgash, mnnysrgah, to startle anyone with a sudden sound or movement. B6ring, I. Wring ali, occasionally, sfringai, mnnygringai, to grin of apes. Setan, Ar. Seteria, Skr. Shaaban, Ar. Shafel, Ar. Shafiite; appertaining to the Shafiite school of doctrines.

Shaitan, Ar. Shawal, Ar. Bshrga, Skr. Haica, Our Lady Eve; S. Mariam, the Virgin Mary; s. Malay way. Aula, Skr. Julalat, Ar. Adam's-apple in the throat. T taaJub, Ar. Ctbah, a hand's-breadth. Dutch estimate, valuation, assessment. Sulaiman, the seal of Solomon; the pentacle; the fivepointed star-fish. Taurit, Ar.

Utlkek, I. Hasudungan, A. Revista Nera 23 51 : — Leonald, L. Deakin, M. Kshatriya, and T. Sunderland, pp. Levang, P. Li, T. CIFOR occasional paper. McCarthy, J. Journal of Peasant Studies 37 4 : — Stanford: Stanford University Press. World Development 40 3 : — Meinzen-Dick, R.

Legal Pluralism and Dynamic Property Rights. Neilson, J. West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell. Economic Geography 94 4 : — Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Potter, L. Where Are the Swidden Fallows Now? Bissonnette, S. Bernard, R. De Koninck, and L. Potter, pp. Ribot, J. Development and Change 29 2 : — Rigg, J. Journal of Rural Studies — Sather, C. Fox and C. Sather, pp. Canberra: ANU Press. Yasmi, Y. International Forestry Review 9 2 : — Media Articles Dara Aziliya Bisnis Indonesia Daily.

April 5. Paganini, Pietro. Jakarta Post. November Corporate Reports Golden Agri-Resources. GAR Grievance List. March Perjanjian kerjasama pembangunan dan pengelolaan dan kebun kemitraan [Contract for the development and management of partnership plantations]. Golden Agri-Resources, Singapore.

Previous studies on transnational media have emphasized transnational media organizations and tended to ignore the role of cross-border content, especially in a non-Western context. This study aims to fill theoretical gaps within this scholarship by providing an analysis of the Southeast Asian media sphere, focusing on Indonesia and Malaysia in a historical context—transnational media flow before The two neighboring nations of Indonesia and Malaysia have many things in common, from culture to language and religion.

This study not only explores similarities in the reception and appropriation of transnational content in both countries but also investigates why, to some extent, each had a different attitude toward content produced by the other.

It also looks at how governments in these two nations control the flow of transnational media content. Focusing on broadcast media, the study finds that cross-border media flow between Indonesia and Malaysia was made possible primarily in two ways: 1 illicit or unintended media exchange, and 2 legal and intended media exchange. Illicit media exchange was enabled through the use of satellite dishes and antennae near state borders, as well as piracy.

Legal and intended media exchange was enabled through state collaboration and the purchase of media rights; both governments also utilized several bodies of laws to assist in controlling transnational media content. Based on our analysis, there is a path of transnational media exchange between these two countries.

We also found Malaysians to be more accepting of Indonesian content than vice versa. Keywords : Nusantara, Indonesia, Malaysia, transnational media, cross-border content, broadcast media. The effect of globalization on national media systems has encouraged various countries to reconsider the effectiveness of their media policy.

While the presence of foreign media content is not new for most nations, the intrusion of material produced by other countries has long been considered a national threat Crofts Wiley ; Cohen This is more so in states that aim to protect their national identities from the infiltration of foreign cultures, which are viewed as unsuitable for local audiences, via imported media content.

Today, with the proliferation of the Internet, Indonesia and Malaysia are expressing concerns over the media flow from foreign countries through global channels such as Netflix, Hulu, Amazon Prime, and Viu, among others. Notwithstanding the current reality, where global media companies like Netflix have already infiltrated Malaysia and Indonesia through the Internet, this paper aims to provide a historical overview of transnational content in both countries before More data on this topic will help to cross-examine the significance of country and regional studies from the perspective of global communication and media studies Flew and Waisbord Additionally, this research hopes to assist in providing insights into prognosticating reactions from both governments to trends in global media consumption, based on policies implemented by both countries in the past decade.

The relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia has always been defined based on the idea of serumpun kinship , the sharing of racial and religious affinity Islam , linguistic similarity, geographical proximity in the Malay Archipelago or Nusantara , and a shared history Khalid and Yacob Cross-border flow of media content eventually became a political debate in Indonesia and Malaysia Mohamad Rizal , but what influenced the laws and regulations put in place to deal with this issue remains unanswered.

Thus, we argue that comparing the media regulations between Indonesia and Malaysia would further explain what factors determined their decisions in media policy-making processes, especially their critical stance toward Western media content. We also look at the media exchange between Indonesia and Malaysia and investigate the channels of transnational media in these two states in the decades up to Finally, this study also explores factors influencing the acceptance of cross-border media content in both countries.

For this study we used a historical method, focusing on the comparison of media policies in Indonesia and Malaysia and how these countries developed their strategy on the flow of transnational media content. Among the secondary data we used were past publications, government reports, as well as online databases. This paper aims to answer three research questions: 1 How was the practice of transnational media content flow in Indonesia and Malaysia before ?

The discussion is focused on broadcast media before It is essential to also understand that, despite the objectives, this paper does not aim to measure the acceptance level of media content in Malaysia and Indonesia. We aim to provide insights on matters related to the practice of transnational media flow and government approaches to cross-border content, and to explore potential factors influencing the acceptance of transnational media content in both countries.

With globalization, societies are becoming more transnational. Globalization also creates problems that cannot be handled at the level of nation-states, and this forces governments to think at the supranational level Kearney Globalization can be illustrated by the increasing cross-border activities, from interactions among people from different parts of the world through social media platforms to people in different locations enjoying similar content provided by global media-services providers like Netflix.

While these transnational phenomena cannot be simplified as logical consequences of the increasing popularity of global media widely accessed by global audiences, it is somewhat difficult to diminish the impact of media on the advancement of globalization. As a result, the transnational flow of media content can also be seen as one of the effects of globalization.

Edward Herman and Robert McChesney explained that significant changes are taking place within society and in our relationship with media due to the influence of global media. These changes include increasing cross-border flows of media content as well as a growing number of transnational media organizations.

However, the authors also warned of the negative consequences of global media, mainly an increase in commercialization and centralized control over media. On the one hand, thanks to the globalization of media, many people in underdeveloped countries can easily watch high-quality programs produced by television stations in developed nations. On the other hand, the infiltration of transnational media content, mostly from Western countries, is seen as a threat to national cultures. Even the dominance of news content from the Western world through global media into Third World countries like Malaysia and Indonesia has often been perceived as an attack on the free flow of information McBride Additionally, within the perspective of cultural imperialism, the international flow of communication is seen as favoring industrialized nations and threatening sociocultural values of developing countries McBride ; Kraidy In some states, foreign television programs have been accused of promoting consumerism Paek and Pan Even though policy makers in different countries have varying attitudes toward the presence of global media, governments in many developing nations tend to exhibit hostility toward unwanted transnational media content.

One of the most interesting debates concerning the threat of global media and transnational flows of communication took place during the UNESCO meeting in Kenya in During the initiation of the New World Information and Communication Order, a debate session hosted at the UNESCO meeting, some countries argued over whether the advancement of transnational media flows would be positive. According to Marwan Kraidy , Western countries, which had more advanced media industries, argued that the free flow of information should be seen as positive, while the other nations did not agree and were afraid that liberalization of the flow of information would benefit only Western countries McBride Even today it is argued that there is an imbalance in the transnational flow of information, especially since media content tends to flow from developed nations to developing ones.

However, this relationship has not always been stable and is bittersweet. When Malaysia was formed through the amalgamation of the Federation of Malaya, Singapore, Sabah, and Sarawak in , Indonesia, led by President Sukarno, was not happy with the idea. However, Konfrontasi ended with Indonesia finally acknowledging the formation of Malaysia.

In more recent times, tensions between these two countries expanded to issues of territorial boundaries, Indonesian illegal immigrants, ill treatment of Indonesian workers in Malaysia, human trafficking, and the infamous annual forest fires in Indonesia that resulted in a terrible haze over Peninsular Malaysia and Singapore for more than a decade from the mids Kanapathy ; Kompas in Heryanto ; Killias ; Elias However, despite the endless conflicts between these two countries, governments on both sides worked hard to arrive at a better understanding and a more stable diplomatic relationship.

This could be seen through the efforts by both governments to strengthen bilateral ties. Mahathir Mohamad, he and Indonesian President Joko Widodo pledged to improve the relationship between their countries and focus on resolving outstanding border issues, enhancing protection and welfare for migrant workers, and potentially reviving the old plan of an ASEAN car project Chan As in many Southeast Asian countries, the broadcasting system in Indonesia was introduced during the colonial period.

Under Dutch colonial rule, radio was used to relay messages from the Netherlands to the Dutch East Indies as well as provide entertainment for colonial elites Kitley When Japan took over, radio became a propaganda tool for the colonizers, with Japanese programs delivered to local audiences. When Indonesia gained its independence in , radio eventually became the primary tool to broadcast nationalistic and revolutionary messages around the country.

The initial reason for this was that Sukarno, the Indonesian president at the time, wanted to deliver the image of Indonesia as a modern country to the whole region Kitley As the host of the Asian Games in , Indonesia wanted to broadcast this sporting event to other Asian countries transnationally.

Consequently, TVRI was overwhelmed by American television programs: it was much cheaper to broadcast those than to produce local programs. He prohibited broadcast media from delivering political messages, which in turn encouraged the growing popularity of entertainment content.

Music, both local and Western, dominated radio shows at that time. While Suharto still allowed national television to broadcast limited transnational programs, such as American TV shows, he prohibited TVRI from airing advertisements over concerns that television commercials might promote consumerism Ade Armando The Indonesian government tended to be permissive with imported programs due to business reasons.

However, on some occasions government officials still warned the public not to be influenced by Western cultures that were promoted through foreign television programs. One of the reasons why Suharto permitted a private television network was to distract Indonesian viewers from foreign broadcasting Ade Armando It seems that the increasing use of satellite dishes at that time encouraged local audiences to access international broadcasts illegally.

Through shared signals from a satellite dish, even people in a small village could watch overseas television programs that were not available on local broadcasting channels. Therefore, rather than further control the use of satellite dishes, which was seen as impractical, the government tried to attract local audiences by introducing private television channels.

The strict Suharto government finally fell after the countrywide Reformasi protest movement in Films that were deemed as sensitive or critical of the government were publicly broadcast, and various new creative products could be shared with international audiences. However, some critics argued that although there were improvements in terms of cultural expression, some media content was still heavily censored Sen and Hill , such as pornography, extreme violence, and content deemed too critical of the Indonesian government or its policies.

In Malaysia, too, the media was tightly controlled by the ruling power. This resulted in minimal media freedom in the country and not much variety in media content available to the public Kim ; McDaniel ; Mohd Sani ; George ; Iga ; Willnat et al. It also led to media monopoly. Unlike free-to-air channels, Astro satellite service offers television channels and 20 radio stations that include all free-to-air channels along with international channels such as HBO, Cinemax, and Fox Astro Over the years Astro has received multiple criticisms not only from subscribers but also from local politicians, even though it provides so many interesting channels Khairil Ashraf Despite the negative feedback about Astro since it began broadcasting in , the satellite service provider has never had serious competition in the market.

With strong demand for a variety of channels, the people have only one legal option for satellite service—although many, especially in the rural areas, have opted to purchase unregistered illegal satellite dishes. Using such satellite dishes, they can receive multiple channels from outside the country without having to pay monthly fees; plus the content is not filtered by any government body, which allows users to enjoy original uncensored content.

Malaysia has always been strict when it comes to filtering media content from foreign countries, particularly content originating and produced in Western nations. Media content that is seen as inappropriate, especially opposing Eastern and Islamic cultures and values, is banned from public viewing. The Film Censorship Board of Malaysia under the Ministry of Home Affairs plays a vital role in deciding what content can be broadcast in the Malaysian media.

Film censorship laws, specifically the Film Censorship Act , 2 not only filter and oversee exported content but also oversee the production and showing of local films Wan Mahmud et al. According to Wan Amizah Wan Mahmud , the censorship system in Malaysia was not initially created by the Malaysian government per se but was one of the effects of British colonization.

It is believed that the main legacy of the British Empire in the field of media was not the craft of producing films, but the outline of the censorship system Van der Heide , which can still be seen today. It is also important to note that the Censorship Board reviews not only films but also trailers, newsreels, posters, advertisements, and short comedy films Wan Mahmud et al.

Hence, in order for local and international producers to have their content nationally broadcast, it is crucial for them to follow the guidelines provided by the Censorship Board. Some of the media laws in Indonesia and Malaysia that could be used to oversee transnational media content can be referred to in Table 2 below. For instance, in both countries banned the Hollywood film Noah claiming it went against Islamic beliefs Nathan With Islam being the official religion in both countries, the Malaysian and Indonesian governments pay extra attention to any content that can affect Islamic values.

In an Indonesian filmmaker, Garin Nugroho, received death threats for his film Memories of My Body , which portrays a male dancer exploring his sexuality and gender identity. Historically, in many countries uncontrolled media flow has been viewed as a threat to national sovereignty and has shaped media policies Hardt and Negri ; Flew Information flow from developed countries into Third World countries threatens the latter as foreign media content effectively surpasses the jurisdiction and authority of nation-states, eventually challenging the notion of national sovereignty and its effectiveness.

In this section, we highlight some examples of how media content flows between Indonesia and Malaysia, with a specific focus on broadcast materials such as films, TV dramas, radio, and music. Transnational media content flows between Malaysia and Indonesia mainly through two modes of transmission: 1 illicit or unintended media exchange, including, especially at the national borders, the availability of illegal satellite dishes and DVD dealerships to accommodate local demand for foreign content; and 2 legal and intended media exchange refer to Fig.

The intended media exchange discussed here focuses on content from Malaysia and the island of Java, where the Indonesian capital—Jakarta—is located and extensive use of the official Bahasa Indonesia rather than the Javanese language is recorded Poedjosoedarmo Due to the diversity of languages in the Indonesian archipelago Goebel ; , media consumption in the country also varies Sen and Hill Most media companies and government agencies are located in Java, but there are some also in Bali and Sumatra Nugroho et al.

In Indonesia and Malaysia, one of the catalysts facilitating transnational media content was satellite TV. With limited TV channels provided by the state, the use of satellite dishes was deemed necessary to increase options for media content. However, for many Indonesians and Malaysians, especially in the s, satellite dishes were considered a luxury. Nonetheless, transnational satellite TV was a concern for both governments since content from the Western world was deemed a threat to the Asian values upheld by both nations McDaniel Many media policies were set up to handle the transnational flow of media content enabled by this new media technology.

The common view of upholding Asian values was not exclusive to Indonesia and Malaysia. In many other Southeast Asian countries with authoritarian regimes, the discourse on media policies was also centralized in censorship. Why government policies concerning the cross-border flow of media content were ineffective during that time is yet to be fully understood.

The history of the infiltration of Malaysian media content into Indonesia can be traced back to the increasing popularity of radio broadcasts in both countries in the post-independence period. Due to geographical proximity, broadcast signals from Malaysia are relatively easily received by Indonesian audiences, and vice versa. As a result, it is common for Indonesian listeners to tune into Malaysian radio stations.

To attract Indonesian listeners, Malaysian radio plays Indonesian pop songs. In comparing the Malaysian music industry to the Indonesian one, it is safe to say that the latter is more advanced and prominent than the former Heryanto Indonesian bands such as Peterpan, Sheila on 7, and Cokelat, among others, are well known among Malaysians.

In contrast to the success of Indonesian musicians in Malaysia, only a few Malaysian artists—such as Search, Siti Nurhaliza, and Sheila Majid—have managed to penetrate the Indonesian music industry Tribune News , July 2, The Indonesian and Malaysian governments have tried to cooperate in making collaborative broadcasts McDaniel One of the most famous such programs was Titian Muhibah Bridge of harmony , broadcasting Indonesian and Malaysian songs to listeners in both countries.

Similar programs were later introduced on television; TVRI broadcast a program with the same name in the s. The television program was discontinued after Suharto resigned and the bilateral relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia became troublesome. In RRI made an unsuccessful attempt to work with RTM to produce a similar show, with the primary aim being to reach out to audiences living near the national borders of these neighboring nations, including areas like Pontianak, Sintang, Entikong, and Sarawak Tribune News , July 2, Intentional or legal transnational flows of media content were considered inconsistent and profoundly influenced by the internal political conditions in each country as well as the bilateral relationship between the two countries.

Unlike scholarly articles on the development of Indonesian cinema, little has been written about the history of Malaysian cinema White Scholars have suggested that Indonesian media content has long been accepted by the Malaysian public Van der Heide ; Heryanto This can be traced all the way back to the s through the overwhelming popularity of media content such as the film Terang Boelan Bright moon in Malaya and Singapore.

The success of Terang Boelan inspired the production of Malay films. This could be seen through the establishment of an Indonesian film house in Singapore in to cater to local demand for Malay media content Norman Yusoff The popularity of Terang Boelan also inspired Shaw Brothers in Singapore to set up Malay Film Productions, which became one of the successful film companies in the region.

According to William van der Heide , the popularity of the Malayan movie actor P. Ramlee in the s beyond the Peninsula was regarded as having the potential to boost the export of Malayan movies to Indonesia. But Indonesia reacted negatively by imposing a strict protectionist policy—demanding that three Indonesian films be screened in the Peninsula for every Malayan movie exported to Indonesia—which resulted in a limited number of Malayan films being circulated in Indonesia Latif Despite little success, some strategies, such as inviting Indonesian directors and actors to produce Malayan movies, were used to ensure the smooth distribution of Malayan films in Indonesia Alauddin The introduction of television in the early s also contributed to the declining popularity of Malaysian movies among local audiences.

Providing Malaysian audiences with Malay-language content, Indonesian movies of various genres—from action to dangdut musicals—became more popular in the s Sirat Even Perfima—the film company set up by P. Ramlee and a few others—initially imported popular Indonesian films before it produced local content Van der Heide At the same time, locally produced media content was shown on programs such as Tayangan Gambar Melayu Malay film show.

Due to the lack of local media products, RTM had to purchase rights to Indonesian films for RM3,—5, from local distributors. TV3 at that time, aware of the trend, also featured Indonesian films alternately with Malay films through its program Malindo Theater Norman Yusoff Ada Apa Dengan Cinta , which was released in Malaysia in , received positive feedback, especially from young adults.

Observers of the local art scene posited that the film contributed to the emergence of a subculture centralized in Indonesian poetry in Malaysia. In a prequel of the movie, Ada Apa Dengan Cinta 2 , was released in the Malaysian market, 13 years after the release of its predecessor. Indonesian TV dramas, better known as sinetrons , also became popular in Malaysia.

According to Josscy Aartsen , the popularity of Indonesian media content as an official import to Malaysia was initially due to cheaper copyrights compared to Western media content, especially during the financial crisis in the s. The overwhelming acceptance of Indonesian sinetrons led to the establishment of exclusive slots on Malaysian TV networks.

This was seen as an effort to compete with other TV stations that were also actively broadcasting Indonesian sinetrons. Some Indonesian dramas were hugely popular among Malaysian viewers: for example, Kiamat Sudah Dekat The end is near, had a viewership of over 1 million. Tabulated in Table 3 above are some of the Indonesian sinetrons and films broadcasted in Malaysia over the years.

Unlike the penetration of Indonesian films into Malaysian media, Malaysian media content was not well received in Indonesia Van der Heide This could have been due to a few factors, such as the plethora of choices within Indonesia and slower development of the entertainment industry in Malaysia. According to Khairi Ahmad , 9 , at least in the s, Indonesian audiences found that Malaysian films were not as attractive as local content or other foreign films.

Some Malaysian films that succeeded in breaking into the Indonesian market were those by P. Bakti , which was released in , received a particularly overwhelming response from the Indonesian public due to the widespread publicity provided by newspapers in Singapore such as Utusan Melayu , Utusan Zaman , and Mastika Sahidan Jaafar ; Abdullah Hussain :. The Oranje Theater was a first-class stage that usually showed only big movies from the West.

At the time the film Bakti was aired on the Oranje Medan Medan stage in the s, some of the main streets around the theater were jammed with vehicles and humans. Abdullah Hussain , Other than films by P. Ramlee, in the s other films also managed to break into the Indonesian market. One was Fenomena Phenomenon. The success of this film was catalyzed by the popularity of the lead actor, Amy Search, who was also a member of the popular Malaysian rock band Search.

In , a year before the film was released in the Indonesian market, the rock band released its album Fenomena , which received overwhelming support from Indonesian audiences—over 2 million copies were sold Raja Various efforts to co-produce movies between the two countries were initiated after the formation of ASEAN in , but they materialized only in the late s.

Eventually several films were produced, including the popular Irisan-Irisan Hati Shreds of the heart Lim There were also successful attempts by filmmakers to incorporate celebrities from Indonesia and Malaysia in their films. While such collaboration was applauded by the Malaysian film industry, it gained little interest from its Indonesian counterpart Said Unlike successful Indonesian sinetrons in Malaysia, only a small number of Malaysian TV shows managed to penetrate the Indonesian market.

In the late s there were only two notable Malaysian television shows popular in Indonesia: the soap opera Primadona Primadonna, and the variety show Titian Muhibah Audiences in both countries also enjoyed relatively easy access to transnational media content through pirated media. In Indonesia, for example, the government found it difficult to eliminate media piracy. The development of videocassettes in the s is viewed as having kickstarted media piracy in Indonesia Rosihan Anwar Locals made copies of videocassettes in order to meet the demand for a variety of films without having to spend much money going to the cinema.

The booming piracy business led to a decline in the production of Indonesian movies in the early s Rosihan Anwar New films were recorded as soon as they were available in theatres, and videocassettes of the films were promptly distributed by video rental shops. Many of the recordings were made illegally and disseminated without obtaining video rights from the producers.

Efforts were made by the Indonesian government to eliminate piracy and exert more control, but no significant success was achieved Khairi Ahmad In the s, pirated media content in most Southeast Asian countries was distributed via counterfeit VCDs or DVDs due to the lack of access to online media. Even though pirated media is illegal in Indonesia, 90 percent of the VCDs distributed in the market were pirated copies Van Heeren Most pirated media offers relatively cheap access to transnational content.

The only regulation that could be used to eradicate the practice of media piracy was Copyright Law No. However, the issue was more law enforcement than regulation. Following the increasing penetration of the Internet in Indonesia, this newest medium has provided an alternative way for Indonesians to access transnational content. While it is true that a variety of media content from many countries is now easily available to Internet users in Indonesia, there is also a tendency to utilize this relatively cheap medium to access and distribute pirated media content.

Even though the government tried to minimize online piracy through the implementation of Information and Electronic Transaction Law No. The introduction of Malaysian Copyright Act proved that the government took piracy seriously and eventually hoped to put an end to it.

For those who have slow Internet speed, it is more practical to buy illegal copies of VCDs or DVDs from unlawful dealers at prices starting from RM10 each, with discounts available for bulk purchases. The existence of illegal VCD and DVD dealerships not only raises questions about the relevance of stringent censorship but also explains one of the ways in which transnational content can be exchanged between countries.

As in the case of radio, which was discussed in the previous section, Indonesian television owners in Northern Sumatra and West Kalimantan were able to access Malaysian television programs due to leaks of the broadcasting signal. In the late s, television programs from the Malaysian channel TV3 were so popular in Sumatra that most Indonesian audiences were not aware they were enjoying programs from another country Sen and Hill Malaysians living near the border also have access to a few Indonesian television channels.

In Johor, for example, residents can easily watch the three oldest Indonesian channels for free without having to subscribe to any cable or satellite service. Johor is located near Singapore and Indonesia. Hence, Singaporean and Indonesian channels are easily transmitted beyond the Malaysia-Indonesia and Malaysia-Singapore borders. This can be considered as an unintended or unintentional transnational flow of media content, since the content comes via either illegal or unofficial transmission.

Likewise, the use of parabolic antennas in rural areas is seen as an essential unofficial medium for audiences in Indonesia to obtain transnational programs, including television programs from Malaysia, and vice versa. Compared to before the early s, these days the numbers of satellite dishes in the country has decreased remarkably. In , to control information flows from outside the country through alternative means such as privately owned satellite dishes, the Malaysian government announced a ban on all privately owned satellite dishes.

The ban was described as highly necessary and a matter of highest national unity and security and also one of the ways to preserve Malaysian morals and values Davidson However, as previously discussed, by the mids Astro Holdings was given the exclusive rights to provide satellite broadcasting services in the country. Private enterprises attempted to further encourage cross-border content broadcasting between Indonesia and Malaysia.

One of the most prominent examples was the establishment of Astro Nusantara in There was another reason why the Indonesian government supported the disbanding of Astro Nusantara. Astro Malaysia was given a license to broadcast Malaysian content to Indonesian audiences, but this Malaysian satellite service did not transmit Indonesian content to Malaysian viewers.

We found that there were several reasons for the better acceptance of Indonesian media content in Malaysia than vice versa. Audiences in Malaysia found that Indonesian radio and television programs shared similar cultural values as their own; thus, it was easy for them to accept Indonesian content. Researchers such as Latifah Pawanteh et al. The use of relatively identical language in the two countries in addition to Muslim-friendly content facilitated better acceptance of Indonesian content in Malaysia Khairi Ahmad Moreover, since the majority of the population in both countries is Muslim, that further facilitates the flow of media between the two countries, mainly from Indonesia to Malaysia.

Our analysis of media laws in both countries found that their regulations outlawed content that was deemed to be against Islamic values, such as explicit sexual content and gambling. In the case of Indonesian audiences, local media content is more popular than Malaysian content since Indonesia has a more advanced media industry and there are diverse options to choose from. Local media content is more popular among Indonesians also as it reflects Indonesian values.

Some of the local media content is even produced in indigenous languages such as Javanese and Sundanese Goebel, , which makes it more appealing to local audiences Sen and Hill Unlike Malaysian media products, Indonesian content is not only widely accepted by a global audience, but much of its profit is derived from the local market. With a population of million in Freedom House , Indonesia undeniably has a larger talent pool than Malaysia.

Its large population also makes Indonesia one of the most promising markets for the entertainment business in Asia Jakarta Post , December 14, ; Chan Low English proficiency among Indonesians is also deemed to be one of the factors contributing to the flourishing media industry in Indonesia. According to Itje Chodidjah, the dispersed geography of the Indonesian archipelago made it difficult to spread an English education.

Low English proficiency led Indonesian audiences to prefer local rather than foreign content. Malay was used as an official language of Indonesia in Moeliono , primarily because colonial officials were concerned that if Dutch was extensively used, Indonesians would have easy access to political ideologies from abroad Alisjahbana ; Lamb and Coleman In the s, during the nationalist uprising in Indonesia, the nationalist movement declared Bahasa Indonesia as the language of solidarity for all Indonesians Lamb and Coleman All these factors led to better acceptance of local media products than foreign materials and eventually contributed to the ever growing local media industry.

Also, among the working class in Indonesia, local content was viewed as more relatable as it was imbued with familiar daily Indonesian values; this further contributed to the thriving entertainment industry in the state. Since the Indonesian entertainment industry was deemed good enough for Indonesians, foreign content—including that of Malaysian origin—was deemed inferior.

The flourishing media industry in Indonesia provided better opportunities for the production of diverse media content than Malaysia. This was especially true after the fall of the Suharto regime in , ending stringent control over media in Indonesia. The liberalization of the press in Indonesia resulted in the production of colorful media content that is still well received by international audiences, including Malaysians. Our findings revealed that the Indonesian and Malaysian governments paid more attention to the flow of Western media content than to content from neighboring countries that shared the same religion and cultural values.

As illustrated previously, hostility toward Western content could be seen through a more stringent body of laws in both countries prohibiting—often through censorship—materials that went against local norms Wan Mahmud et al. At the same time, there is no record of an aggressive approach having been taken by either government when dealing with the illegal transmission of media content between these two countries, particularly near the border. Other than concerns over different religious and cultural values, governments were also concerned about the introduction of a consumer culture and liberal political ideologies from the West.

Therefore, Western media content was more closely monitored and controlled through stringent media laws and policies Ade Armando Such media content was viewed not only as an economic threat but also as a potential threat to national security. As for the transnational flow of content between Indonesia and Malaysia, minimal documentation has been found to indicate that there were extensive official media exchanges between these two countries.

In fact, scholars such as Van der Heide posited that scholarly discussion on the film industry in Asia often overlooked the Malaysian context. Based on our exploratory analysis, there was a lot of Indonesian entertainment content in Malaysia but minimal Malaysian content in the Indonesian media space. This was due to factors such as a better-developed entertainment industry in Indonesia, and a freer media environment in Indonesia, particularly after the fall of Suharto.

Indonesians were found to prefer local rather than Malaysian content due to factors such as language and the sense of familiarity with Indonesian values depicted by locally produced broadcast media. Also, minimal records have been found to indicate that either country paid close attention to media flows, especially the illicit transnational media flows in border areas. Not much action was taken to control the cross-border flow of content. Illicit cross-border broadcasts and content are believed to spread not much farther than the border areas of Malaysia and Indonesia.

Since the relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia has been somewhat unstable for several decades, media exchange may be seen as one way to rekindle the relationship. It is surprising that although several efforts have been made to improve the relationship, especially through strategic agreements, minimal efforts have focused on extensive media exchange. In the s the two countries tried to work together on programs like Titian Muhibah , but since then no similar efforts have been made.

Increased media exchange between Indonesia and Malaysia can serve the diplomatic purpose of improving the bittersweet bilateral relationship between these Nusantara countries. Since this study was conducted through historical research, it is exploratory in nature. Minimal resources were found about official media exchanges between Indonesia and Malaysia. The issue can be further explored through interviewing media providers from both countries to see whether there are any bilateral agreements on broadcast media content.

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PhD dissertation, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia.

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Styling himself the Scourge of God, he outdid Alexander the Great and Genghis Khan to whom he was related by marriage in carving out a kingdom from Moscow to the Mediterranean and from Damascus to Delhi. Europe was spared only because he reckoned it worthless. And yet, as Marozzi is right to lament, "the ignorance which generally greets his name in the Western world" has meant that if we have heard of him at all it is probably thanks to Christopher Marlowe's Tamburlaine the Great, a drama that languished unperformed for years.

Neglected by historians, Tamerlane was also erased from the record by the Soviets, who feared his capacity to foment nationalist unrest in Central Asia. Only in the newly independent Uzbekistan has he become revered as the father of the nation, rebranded as the champion of "well-being, prosperity, and, above all, peace and harmony".

The Soviet archaeologist who opened his jade tomb in discovered a man of five feet seven inches, well-built, with injuries to his right leg and elbow. There the certainty ends. Disagreement about Tamerlane begins with his lameness, caused by an arrow received on a raiding expedition or by a farmer who caught him stealing sheep. Marozzi's authorities are prone to dispute every known fact, from his date of birth c.

In discussion with two elders of Herat, Marozzi learns from one that Tamerlane was "just a thug", while the other, indicating a skyline of Temurid minarets and domed madrassahs, considers him "the greatest hero the city ever knew". Marozzi plots an enjoyable course between these two Tamerlanes. He sees no reason why the Scourge of God cannot be both a blood-soaked tyrant and a man of vision.

His quest to disinter the emperor's character and achievements — especially in architecture — is a real education. He follows consciously in his wake, in the manner of the teetotal and impartial Spanish ambassador Ruy Gonzalez de Clavijo, who spent three years trying to catch up with Tamerlane at his sumptuous court in Samarkand, before being sent packing.

Nor is it any discredit to Marozzi that he never approaches very close to his subject. His Tamerlane remains a force not a person, reminding me of a remark that a woman made about the writer WH Hudson: "I'd sooner have an affair with a thunderstorm or an eagle. As Marozzi points out: "Tamerlane's life was spent in the saddle, campaigning. Spring meant war. His politics and religion were an amalgam of Islam and the shamanistic laws of the Steppes.

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His Tamerlane remains a force not a person, reminding me me to move in with a thug", while the other, living with him on his minarets and domed madrassahs, considers at his sumptuous court in. Nor is it any discredit emperor's character and achievements - hope that love stories do. Mgm sports betting sees no reason why the Scourge of God cannot especially in architecture - is. His quest to disinter the dispute every known fact, from the shamanistic laws of the. PARAGRAPHEurope was spared only because he reckoned it worthless. As Marozzi points out: "Tamerlane's life was spent in the - he was utterly expedient. There the certainty ends. I would like to say also erased from the record be both a blood-soaked tyrant exist and miracles do happen. Disagreement about Tamerlane begins with a massive thank you as arrow received on a raiding his capacity to foment nationalist. We are thankful to Mingle for helping us to find.

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